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Abstract
We explore the evolution of cooperation in the framework of the evolutionary game theory
using the prisoner’s dilemma as metaphor of the problem. We present a minimal model taking into
account the growing process of the systems and individuals with imitation capacity. We consider the
topological structure and the evolution of strategies decoupled instead of a coevolutionary dynamic.
We show conditions to build up a cooperative system with real topological structures for any natural
selection intensity. When the system starts to grow, cooperation is unstable but becomes stable as
soon as the system reaches a small core of cooperators whose size increase when the intensity of
natural selection decreases. Thus, we reduce the emergence of cooperative systems with cultural
reproduction to justify a small initial cooperative structure that we call cooperative seed. Otherwise,
given that the system grows principally as cooperator whose cooperators inhabit the most linked
parts of the system, the benefit-cost ratio required for cooperation evolve is drastically reduced
compared to the found in static networks. In this way, we show that in systems whose individuals
have imitation capacity the growing process is essential for the evolution of cooperation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
What is cooperation? By definition, cooperation is the process of acting or working
together. Some examples of systems where cooperation is present are the cells working to-
gether in order to form multicellular organisms and multicellular organisms working together
to form societies such as anthills and the human society. It is noteworthy that cooperating
biological systems make up new organisms that in turn can cooperate to form a new one
with higher complexity. This shows that cooperation is a mechanism through which nature
increases complexity of life. In this way, if there are organisms made up by other cooperative
organisms, what would happen when for some reason these stop cooperating? What would
happen to us if our cells stop cooperating? We easily note that the lack of cooperation
means the death of the most complex organism. Therefore, understanding the mechanisms
that allow cooperation to emerge and prevail is essential.
Cooperation [1–4] is ubiquitous in biological systems and it supposes an evolutionary
transition from isolated individuals to groups. Understanding how this transition arises
within the framework of Darwinian theory is a big conceptual challenge that has received a
lot of attention in the last fifty years [5–14]. In this long and successful tradition, the first
formal attempt to solve the problem was introduced by Hamilton in his celebrated paper of
1964 [5]. In this work cooperation is favored by natural selection if the genetic relatedness
between individuals exceeds the benefit-cost ratio of the altruistic act.
The cooperation problem is usually studied in the framework of the evolutionary game
theory [15, 16]. In this, the system can be represented by a network whose nodes are the
individuals and the links represent who interacts with whom. Usually, the interactions are
modeled by the Prisoner’s Dilemma where each individual takes a strategy and plays against
its neighbors. There are two strategies: cooperation (C) or defection (D). A cooperator
gives a benefit b and incurs in a cost c for each individual it interacts with, where b > c is
required to define the game correctly. In contrast, a defector does not give benefits and has
no costs, but it can receive the benefit b from those cooperators it interacts with. The result
of interactions of each individual defines its payoff P . The system evolves replicating more
often successful strategies. Therefore, natural selection is introduced through payoff since
individuals with a higher one reproduce more. The reproduction can be either genetic or
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cultural. When it is genetic, the most successful individuals have the most offspring. When
reproduction is cultural the strategies of successful individuals are more likely to be imitated
by their neighbors. It is worth noting that a case of cultural reproduction is indistinguishable
from a death-bird process [17] when just the strategy of the individual is taken into account.
However, throughout the text we will refer only to cultural reproduction considering that
individuals have imitation capacity.
Until the early nineties the cooperation problem was only studied in fully connected
systems in which unilateral defection is always the best strategy. Therefore defection is
favoured by natural selection and invades the whole system. In order to overcome this
problem, it was necessary to introduce other features to the system increasing the strategic
complexity. In 1981, Axelrod and Hamilton. [6] showed that if the probability of new
encounters between individuals is high enough, cooperation based on reciprocity can evolve.
Furthermore, other features such as reputation [10] to individuals or punishment [14] for
defectors were introduced.
However, it is well known that real systems are far from being fully connected. In a
pioneer paper [18], Nowak and May considered the problem over two-dimensional regular
lattices showing that if individuals only have information of a neighborhood instead of
the whole system, there are conditions in which cooperation prevail without the need to
increase strategic complexity. Recently, together with the development of the graph theory,
the cooperation problem has been studied considering more realistic topological structures
of interactions [19–32]. In particular, Santos et al. [20, 21] showed how important the degree
heterogeneity of the network could be for cooperation. In these works [18–32] the problem
is considered assuming static networks large enough to ensure that the topological features
under study are well developed. Initially each individual adopts cooperation o defection
with equal probability, in order to not favor any strategy. After this, the system evolves
updating strategies following an evolutionary game. Even though it has been shown that
some topological features favor the sustainability of cooperation, the problem has not been
completely solved given the high benefit-cost ratio required to promote cooperation with
respect to those observed in nature. In particular, the difficulty present in static systems
becomes evident when the system increase the average number of links [17, 22]. In particular,
static systems present the following two limitations.
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On the one hand, in many real systems the links are not static but there is a rewiring
process. This has motivated the development of mechanisms with coevolution between the
topological structure and the evolutionary game [33–38]. In this way, the result of the game
changes the topology which in turn changes the game result and so on until the cooperation
level and the topological properties become time independent. These coevolutionary dynam-
ics have shown to be a powerful mechanism to support cooperation as well as to produce
the emergence of topologies of real systems. Furthermore, it is important to note that these
models also take into account systems with degree heterogeneity and individuals with only
local information. These features seem to be essential ingredients for cooperation.
On the other hand, cooperative biological systems do not emerge spontaneously fully
developed but they are formed by a growing process from one or few individuals. Besides,
it is remarkable that in all stages the system has levels of cooperation higher than half of
the population. Another essential feature of biological systems is the possibility of mutation
which in the context of cooperation means a spontaneous change of strategy. Therefore,
taking into account the growing process and the possibility of mutations, we formulated the
cooperation problem as follows:
- What conditions should the system have to grow as a highly cooperative system?
- What are the system properties that allow to resist the emergence of mutant defectors
in a cooperative system?
Here we explore the cooperation problem considering the growing process of the system
and individuals with imitation capacity. It is noteworthy that the growing process has also
been considered [37] as a mechanism to introduce co-evolutionary dynamics. We consider
that the topological structure and the evolutionary game are decoupled. We focus our
attention in the first question assuming that the probability of mutation is low enough
to be neglected, this is a routinely simplification in literature [17–32]. Nevertheless, it
is remarkable that this alternative way of approaching the problem is general, since it is
applicable to all cooperative system in which there are mutations and it has been generated
by network growth. Otherwise, the second question could be useful for cancer research given
the similarity between defectors and tumor cells.
4
II. THE MODEL
The system is represented by a network of interconnected nodes. Each node is an indi-
vidual who interacts with those who are connected with it. We considered all nodes equal
and all connections undirected and with equal weight. Each interaction between individuals
is modeled by a round of the prisoner’s dilemma defined in the introduction. This definition
allows to reduce the game parameters to one defined by the benefit-cost ratio r = b/c. Each
individual only plays against all its neighbors. If the individual i is a cooperator and inter-
acts with ki neighbors, it receives a payoff Pi = bk
c
i−cki, where kci is the number of neighbors
who are cooperators. When i is a defector connected to ki neighbors, it receives a payoff
Pi = bk
c
i . Here, we consider a process based on pairwise comparison between individuals to
introduce cultural reproduction. We perform the strategy updates in a synchronous way, i.e.
all nodes are updated simultaneously. A complete update of the system is called a genera-
tion. When node i updates strategy, it takes the strategy of a random chosen neighbor with
probability w, which is function of Pj−Pi. On the other hand, the node i keeps its strategy
with probability 1 − w. Since natural selection favor successful strategies, w increase with
Pj − Pi. We define w = w(Pj − Pi) as [37–41], choosing the Fermi function from statistical
physics, which is given by
wj→i =
1
1 + e−β(Pj−Pi)
, (1)
The parameter β, which corresponds to an inverse temperature in statistical physics,
controls the intensity of natural selection. Small β (high temperature) means that selection
is almost neutral, whereas for large β (low temperature) selection can become arbitrarily
strong. With decreasing intensity of selection β, the probability for imitation of the ad-
vantageous strategy in the population decreases from 1 to 1/2, selection becoming neutral
for β = 0. Moreover, it is noteworthy that this update rule allows the node i to take the
strategy of node j even if Pi > Pj. This is important because introduce errors in individuals
decision. Also, it is important to state that many other kinds of update rules [42, 43] can
be taking into account. Furthermore, the results cannot be extended directly to any update
rule since they usually are dependent on this choice [43].
Actual cooperative systems grow from one or a few individuals by incorporating new ones
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through two different mechanisms. On the one hand, the new individuals may come from
the reproduction of individuals of the system and, therefore, related genetically. On the
other hand, the system grows by the incorporation of independent individuals who could
not be related genetically to existing individuals. However, unless otherwise specified, the
proportion of new individuals coming from each of the two sources does not change the
results. The system is built up starting from N0 arbitrarily connected nodes. Then, the
system grows by adding new individuals with L = N0 links. We studied two ways in which
the L links are attached to the system: random and preferential attachment [44]. In the
latter case, new nodes are connected with a probability proportional to the degree of already
existing ones, which produces a power-law degree distribution P (k) ∼ k−γ with exponent
γ ' 2, 9 in the thermodynamic limit N → ∞. When the nodes are randomly connected,
the system acquires a degree distribution P (k) that decays exponentially. We choose these
growing mechanisms to cover a wide range of degree heterogeneities.
To take into account the growing process and the strategies update simultaneously it
is necessary to define a temporal scale. We accomplished this through the system size
assuming that dN(t)
dt
= aN(t), where a is the growth rate. When the elimination of nodes
is not considered, the growth rate is equal to the frequency with which individuals are
incorporated to the system. We consider that a is constant over time. Therefore, the
population grows exponentially as N(t) = N(t0)e
a(t−t0). Between two generations the system
grows a constant time ∆t. So if a strategy update is performed when the system has
a population N(t0), then the next one is performed when the system has a population
N(t0 + ∆t) = N(t0)e
a∆t = N(t0)(1 + n), where n is time independent for exponential
growth. Consequently, the strategies are updated each time the system grows a fraction n,
it is important to note that a∆t ' n when a∆t << 1, which give a connection between n
and the measurable value a. Also, the model can be extended to consider other kinds of
growth as for instance the logistic one, where the system initially grows exponentially in time
but then it slows down until the system acquires a maximum size called carrying capacity
of the system. Under this kind of behavior, it is expected that the frequency with which
new individuals are incorporated to the system decreases in time and, therefore, the growing
proportion n before a strategy update also decrease. It has been checked that the results
do not change significantly for values of n less than those shown. Therefore, the conclusions
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reached through the paper do not change when it is performed this kind of consideration.
In particular, if the growth rate decreases i.e. n tends to zero, as we shall show, the level of
cooperation increase into the system when conditions allow cooperation to survive.
Finally, we must define the way individuals choose their first strategy. The Darwinian
Theory restricts how strategies evolve but it does not carry information about the first strat-
egy that each individual takes in its first interaction. In the literature[18–32], cooperation
is the first strategy taken by individuals with probability Pc = 1/2, assuming no bias to-
wards any strategy. For our purposes we can relax this condition to just Pc 6= 0 in order to
introduce cooperation into the system.
III. RESULTS
The topological structures that emerges from the growing process, as the degree distri-
bution, are macroscopic features of the system. Therefore, when the system begins to grow
these topological structures are weakly developed due to lack of statistical [45]. As stated
in the introduction, the macroscopic topological features play an important role in the co-
operation problem, so it is expected that the proposed model behaves differently when the
system starts to grow and when it reaches well defined topological structures. In this way,
we divide the model into two parts in order to explore the model numerically and to perform
a clear analysis from the literature [17–22]. First, we assume that there are conditions under
which the system reaches a state of Ni cooperators. We take Ni large enough to ensure the
degree distribution well developed. From this structure, we seek the conditions required to
maintain a stable and high level of cooperation when the system grows by the incorpora-
tion of defectors. This simulates the worst condition that a cooperative system must resist.
Second, using the conditions found, we look for the minimum Ni = Nc of cooperators that
ensure the stability of the cooperation level within the system.
In Fig. 1 we show the numerical results for the fraction of cooperators into the system as
a function of the benefit-cost ratio b/c for different parameter values of the model and for
the two proposed growing mechanisms. For these results we consider Ni = 5000. We will
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Fig. 1: Conditions to maintain cooperation into the system for scale-free and random
networks. Fraction of cooperators as a function of the benefit-cost ratio for different parameter
values. Each figure presents a phase transition whose critical benefit-cost ratio rc depends mainly
on the degree heterogeneity of the system and the intensity of natural selection. A high degree
heterogeneity reduces the critical benefit-cost ratio value. Moreover, the critical value decreases
when natural selection increases.
later show that with a much smaller structure is sufficient. We let the system evolve until
a stationary regime is reached. The stationary regime is characterized by a stable average
level of cooperation < c > which is the fraction of cooperators in the system. In order
to make an extensive sampling of networks realizations we have performed 100 numerical
simulations for each set of values of parameters studied and averaged accordingly to the
value < c > found in each realization. Also, it is important to note that the system does
not evolve as a Moran process [46] because the system grows in time instead of having a
fixed population. Therefore, when 0 < Pc < 1 the system cannot reach permanently the
absorbing states < c >= 1 or < c >= 0 usually found in Moran processes. Given that the
system growth from Ni cooperator by incorporation of defectors (Pc = 0 from N > Ni), the
systems can be absorbed by the state < c >= 0 but not by the state < c >= 1 for any value
of β and r.
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In all figures we can see a phase transition from a noncooperative to a cooperative state
when r exceeds the critical threshold rc. When the benefit-cost ratio is above rc, with n
and β fixed, the cooperative system resists the incorporation of new defectors reaching a
nonzero and stable value of < c > into the system. But, if the b/c is below the threshold,
the new defectors are strong enough to invade the whole system by imitation. When r > rc
the systems is almost fully cooperative and defectors inhabit the less linked nodes. Under
these circumstances the payoff P is almost proportional to the degree k of the nodes and
the most connected ones are cooperators connected mainly to other cooperators. Thus, if
b/c is high enough, new defectors may have a higher payoff P than nodes with few links, but
nodes with a larger number of links continue to have a higher one. Therefore, defection can
invade part of the system but it is stopped as soon as the invasion reaches sufficiently linked
nodes. After that, the system finds the way to restore cooperation. This is possible because,
while defection invades the system, the payoff of defectors decreases because they reduce
the number of neighbor cooperators, making them weaker. If for some reason b/c decreases
below the threshold value; defection begins to invade the system. But, if the invasion does
not reach the most connected nodes, increasing b/c above its critical value cooperation is
restored into the system. Also, it is important to note that rc is independent of the system
size N when N > Ni.
In addition, as shown Fig. 1, the critical value is not strongly dependent of L which it is
clear for scale-free networks. In particular, we have verified this behavior to L = 32 without
significant changes with the results shown. Therefore, considering that the mean degree
< k >' 2L when N >> L, we may approximate rc as independent of < k > when the
system grows following the proposed models of network generation. This can be understood
by approaching < c > by 1 when r > rc. Under this condition the new defectors receive a
Payoff proportional to L given that all its neighbors are cooperators. Furthermore, we can
assume that the new defector exploits cooperators with an average Payoff proportional to
< k >. Therefore, given that the relation < k > /L ' 2 is independent of L, it is expected
rc to be independent of < k >. It is important to note as it has been shown previously
[17, 22, 25] that the conditions required for cooperation to evolve increase significantly with
< k > in static systems.
As can be seen, for any n and β fixed, scale-free networks reduce drastically the critical
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threshold rc with respect to random networks. The probability that an individual with
low degree it is linked with a highly connected one increases with the degree heterogeneity.
When r > rc, the most connected nodes are occupied by cooperators and the lowest ones by
defectors. Therefore, higher degree heterogeneity generates an increasing number of strong
cooperators that enhance payoff differences with defectors. Thus, the critical rc required to
maintain cooperation into the system decreases. This shows again the importance of the
degree heterogeneity on the sustainability of cooperation [20–22]. However, here rc is dras-
tically reduced compared to those found in static systems. Besides, taking into account that
the difference between rc obtained by static systems and growing ones increases with < k >,
we conclude that the growing process is essential for the evolution of cooperation in systems
whose individual have imitation capacity. The origin of this difference is determined by two
fundamental characteristics caused by the growing process. On the one hand, the system
always has high levels of cooperation instead of initially half of the population considered in
static systems. On the other hand, cooperators inhabit the most linked parts of the system
rather than being initially randomly distributed. This reduces the exploitation capacity of
defectors to a minimum because it is proportional to its degree k.
Moreover, comparing figures 1a and 1d it can be observed that increasing the frequency
of strategy updates (decreasing n) enhances the fraction of cooperators for a benefit-cost
ratio b/c over the critical value, although it is not drastically modified. Here, it is important
to state that equivalent results can be obtained when n decreases from the shown values.
When n→ 0 the system becomes fully cooperative after each strategy update if benefit-cost
ratio is over the critical value. When n grows, the system size required to overcome the
transient becomes bigger and this makes it computationally hard to study for n higher than
those shown. However, when so many defectors are incorporated into the system before a
strategy update, the defectors that become cooperators for each strategy update are less
than the defectors incorporated making it impossible to find conditions where cooperation
spreads into the system in the long run. Also, we can observe that the critical value increases
when natural selection becomes weaker (β → 0). However, it is possible to find conditions
that promote cooperation when the system grows for any natural selection intensity.
As we have shown, new defectors can invade a part of the system. Therefore, when the
system is small these invasions can be enough to invade the whole system. Moreover, in the
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early stages of the system and by the growing mechanisms used, the new individuals have
a number of links similar the existing nodes, which makes the invasions produced by new
defectors more difficult to stop. This shows that cooperation is unstable when the system
begins to grow. To explore this behavior, we study the cooperation fixation probability Pf
as a function of the number Ni of initial cooperators. The cooperation fixation probability
is defined as the probability that a system of Ni cooperators continues being cooperative
when it grows by the incorporation of defectors for a fixed benefit-cost ratio. To obtain Pf
we select a value r just over the critical value rc and we perform M simulations starting
from a system of Ni cooperators. Then, we compute the number Mc of systems that reach
N = 104 with a fraction of cooperators < c > bigger than 1/2. Finally, we compute Pf for
each Ni as Mc/M . For the result we take M = 500.
In Fig. 2 we show the cooperation fixation probability as a function of the number of
initial cooperators Ni. The results shown have been obtained by preferential attachment
growth. As it can be seen in Fig. 2a, the cooperation fixation probability Pf increases more
slowly for lower values of β. However, in all cases Pf increases rapidly reaching the value
1 for some small system size Nc that we call cooperative seed. When the system reaches
the Nc individuals the cooperative seed is ready and cooperation becomes stable when the
system grows. Also, as can be observed in Fig 2b the cooperative seed is larger for larger L.
Given the results shown in Figure 1 we can infer that the system will reach a size beyond
which cooperation will be stable for the parameters and growing mechanism that are not
shown. It is important to state that a similar behavior is found in static systems [20–22]
since cooperation just can evolve from some system size.
It is important to note that the update strategy can be introduced in an asynchronous
way without significant changes in the results. We use synchronous updates only for com-
putational efficiency. Moreover, if instead of the Fermi rule we use the analog of replicator
dynamics for finite populations [20–22] in a synchronous or asynchronous way it is obtained
similar results to those shown with strong natural selection. We use the Fermi rule in order
to tune the natural selection intensity.
Finally, the growing mechanisms presented have some unrealistic features that can worsen
the conditions to maintain cooperation not only when the system is big, but mainly when it is
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Fig. 2: Cooperative seed. Cooperation fixation probability Pf as a function of number of initial
cooperators Ni for different parameter values when the system grows with preferential attachment.
As can be seen, Pf becomes one beyond some critical size Nc. From this structure cooperation
is stable when the system grows. a) For these results we used the following values: L = 4 and
n = 0, 001. b) Here we use β = 1 and n = 0, 001.
small. First, it would be important to take into account that if new individuals are the result
of genetic reproduction, the newborn have less intrinsic adaptability (IA) to the environment
than their parents, where IA is the adaptability of the individual living alone. This feature
allows cooperation to be a better strategy than defection even when both have equal number
of links. Also, it should be considered that newborns are not prepared to reproduce initially
because they are not able to do it at early stages. This reduces the number of defector-
defector links which weakens defection. Furthermore, it would be important to consider
that the links of the new individuals are not performed simultaneously but one at a time.
This is important because it gives the possibility to update the strategies when defectors
have few links and therefore reducing their capacity to exploit cooperators because they
reduce their payoff increasing probability to change strategy. Also, we assume b/c constant
for any system size, but this may not be a good approximation if the resources are limited;
this could be particularly important when the system is small.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
First, we have presented a simple model for the evolution of cooperation in growing
systems whose individuals have imitation capacity. First, we have shown the existence of a
critical benefit-ratio rc beyond which a cooperative system, with a well-defined degree distri-
bution, maintain high level of cooperation when it grows by new defectors. If the frequency
of strategy updates is high enough, there are a rc beyond which cooperation prevails into
the system for the two growing mechanism explored and for any natural selection intensity.
However, we have to bear in mind that conditions are improved when natural selection be-
comes stronger. We show for the considered growing mechanism that rc can be considered
constant with the average degree < k >, this is an unprecedented result in structured pop-
ulations. Besides, we have proved that rc is reduced when degree heterogeneity increase.
This agrees with previous results [20–22]. However, the growing process reduces drastically
rc required to cooperation evolve.
Secondly, we have studied the model when the system is small. We found that under
this condition cooperation can disappear but it is increasingly less likely as the number of
initial cooperators increases. Cooperation becomes stable beyond a certain size of initial
cooperators, what we call cooperative seed. This initial structure can be justified combining
two features of the model: the nonzero probability in which individuals take cooperation as
the first strategy and the cooperation fixation probability which grows fast when the initial
cooperative structure becomes bigger. Clearly, this does not completely solve the problem of
the emergence of cooperation since there are many cases in nature in which the emergence
of cooperation is highly probable from the starting stages of the system. However, it is
important to note that the model allows reduce the problem of the evolution of cooperation
without mutations to justify the formation of the cooperative seed.
The principal features that allow the model to form a cooperative system are the growing
process and the fact that new individuals introduce few links with respect to old ones. These
two conditions ensure degree heterogeneity and individuals with local information that have
been recognized as essential for cooperation. But the growing process also incorporates a
new feature that was not previously taken into account improving the conditions required
in previous works [18–25]; now the system grows mainly formed by cooperators that dwell
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in the most connected part of the system.
We believe that, given the generality and simplicity of the model, it would be of great
interest to test the validity of the results experimentally. We think it is interesting the way
in which we have formulated the problem of cooperation in the introduction. An important
consequence is that it allows explore the emergence of mutants assuming that the whole
system is made up by cooperators. This could change the way the cooperation problem is
addressed. Besides of looking for mechanisms to allow cooperation to invade the system, it
would be interesting to search for mechanisms in which mutants defectors cannot invade a
cooperative system. This new point of view allows to reinterpret some previous results [18–
32] showing that even when a random fifty percent of a population of cooperators becomes
defector there are conditions and topologies that restore cooperation into the system.
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